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Abstract
About the extent of moral agency in the animal kingdom, one view is that only
humans are moral agents. Holding a different view, I argue that moral agency
depends on the capacity for other-regard and the capacity to be attuned to
significance—such that things matter to one. I derive a criterion where a creature is
a moral agent if she performs an action that promotes others’ significant interests
and brings great costs to herself where she is aware of these significant interests
and imposed costs. Failure to confirm that she has this awareness is a weakness of
examples of moral agency in animals that writers provide, since she may be
unaware of the significance of what she is doing. Since species of non-ape Primates
and aquatic mammals satisfy the evidential criterion, moral agency is likely
prevalent throughout much of Mammalia. I consider possible objections from
Kant, Singer, and Korsgaard.

Introduction
Various hypotheses are possible about a moral agent’s
psychological capacities. The assumption seems reasonable that the
capacity to have thoughts about the welfare of others is, though not
the whole story, central to moral agency. To assist us in figuring out
what sort of higher-order intentionality, if any, is necessary and/or
sufficient for moral agency, it helps, first, to distinguish a higherorder thought from a higher-order intentional state. By a “higher
order thought,” I mean a thought that takes a thought as its object.
By a “higher-order intentional state,” I mean a thought that takes an
intentional state as its object.
Reflective and empirical evidence suggests that higher-order
thought is unnecessary and insufficient for moral agency (with higher
-order intentionality being necessary but not sufficient). Reflectively
speaking, an agent may be able to have thoughts about the mental
states of others, which may lack significance for the agent. Although
psychopaths are proficient in higher-order thought, theory of mind,
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and means-ends reasoning, experts with direct experience with
psychopaths conclude that psychopaths are amoral (Cleckley, 1976;
Hare, 1993).1 Moreover, normal people explain the wrongness of a
moral violation by appeal to the victim’s distress, and they
distinguish moral violations from conventional violations as being
more serious, impermissible, and independent of authority (Blair
1995); even children as young as thirty-four months of age
distinguish moral from conventional violations (Smetana 1993). In
contrast, psychopaths see a moral violation such as forgery in the
same way that they see a conventional violation such as poor
etiquette.2 Psychopaths not only fail to distinguish moral violations
from conventional violations, they explain them similarly, and they
fail to appeal to the victim’s distress (Blair 1995). The psychopath’s
higher-order thought and amorality strongly suggest that higherorder thought is insufficient for moral agency.
Reflective evidence suggests that higher-order thought is
unnecessary for moral agency, since a moral agent could care about
others and act to reduce their discomfort by representing and acting
on the emotional or physiological states of others. Assuming that we
sometimes attribute emotional or physiological states without
attributing thoughts to a newborn, we may represent and act
similarly when we, for example, alleviate its pain. Autism is a
condition characterized by selective impairments in higher-order
thought and theory of mind (Baron-Cohen 1995). Despite these
impairments, however, children with autism not only distinguish
moral from conventional violations (Rogers at al. 2008), they are “as
likely as controls [age-matched children without autism] to judge
culpability on the basis of motive, and to judge injury to persons as
more culpable than damage to property” (Grant et al. p. 317).
Although these findings on psychopathy and autism suggest that
higher-order thought is unnecessary and insufficient for moral
agency, the capacity to have thoughts about the welfare of others may
nevertheless be central to moral agency.
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After making a general case for the existence of the mammalian
mind, I propose criteria for being a moral agent and show that
members of nonhuman species of mammals satisfy them.

Mammals' Minds
When humans engage in complex behaviors that do not require
language, such as climbing a tree, hiking new mountain terrain, or
lovemaking, the fact that we are also engaging in thought is beyond
dispute. Since nonhuman mammals engage in similar activities in
similar ways, by a principle of parity, they are also engaging in
thought. If they engage in thought, they have minds.
In one example of a study of many thousands in the expansive
literature that documents the complexity of mammals’ minds,
researchers made audio recordings of elephants for playback to
familiar and unfamiliar elephants (McComb 2003). When elephants
heard the voice of a family member while the family member was
absent, they vocalized back and pursued the source of the sound. If
the family member was already present, they showed little response.
When they heard a strange elephant, they quickly assumed a
defensive formation and retreated from the source of the sound.
These studies suggest that elephants are capable of auditorily
discriminating elephants as individuals. If they do that, they must
have minds with a social awareness of the individual identities of
other elephants. Marc Hauser reports that, upon discovering food,
rhesus monkeys who keep the discovery to themselves receive
aggression from other monkeys. Moreover, “Individuals were able to
detect the discoverer amidst a group of individuals with food and
punish just that discoverer and not additional “walk-ons,”” which
shows that the behavior was intentional, rather than generalized
anger (p. 12139). These findings suggest that rhesus monkeys may
also have a social awareness of other monkeys as individuals, and
that they have a desire to punish hoarding behavior if not also
enforcing some sense of what a monkey should not do. According to
dolphin trainer Karen Pryor (2001), “Dolphins imitate each other
with or without training” and perform “repertoires that they learned
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only by watching through a gate as the other animal performed.” She
believes that “the capacity [of imitation] already exists in many
species, and needs only the right environmental cues to make it
apparent” (p. 352). Studies on mirror self-recognition behavior
report successful mirror self-recognition in one elephant, most
chimpanzees and bonobos, some gorillas and orangutans, two
dolphins, and several killer whales.3 Evidence suggests that some
levels of self-recognition are even present in the cotton-top tamarin, a
New World Monkey.4
Studies of baboons report capacities to rotate objects mentally
(Vauclair et al., 1993). Based on testing and between-species
comparisons of the results, one gorilla has a metaphorical capacity of
the average seven-year-old human child. Beginning in infancy, this
gorilla was taught to use sign language, and she has used thousands
of signs at least once. Upon first seeing a cigarette lighter, she
spontaneously signed “bottle match,” when asked what she can think
of that is hard, she signed “rock and work,” and when asked what an
insult is, she signed “think devil dirty” (cited in DeGrazia, p. 196-7).
Another reason for believing that nonhuman mammals have
minds is the similarity in the findings of human and animal
neuropsychology. For instance, Klüver-Bucy syndrome is a condition
that neurosurgeons created in rhesus monkeys in the 1930s by the
unconscionable removal of the monkeys’ temporal lobes. Although
these monkeys had apparently normal vision, they could not see the
emotional significance of events or objects in the environment. They
would try, for example, to eat rats or rocks or to copulate with
members of other species (Bourtchouladze 2004, p. 82). Doctors
diagnosed humans with Klüver-Bucy syndrome first in the 1950s,
also from bilateral lesions to the temporal lobes. The general pattern
of symptoms was similar to that seen in the rhesus monkeys. These
findings suggest that, with intact temporal lobes, humans and rhesus
monkeys normally discriminate items in their environment according
to differing levels of emotional significance, in which case rhesus
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monkeys have minds with capacities to represent objects and events
with emotional significance.
An additional reason for believing that nonhumans have minds
are the commitments implied by the claims made by researchers,
such as Donald Griffin, Jane Goodall, and Marc Hauser, who study
and write about animal behavior. Making sense of these researchers’
behavior and writings also requires positing animal mental
attributes. The main reason to believe that nonhuman mammals have
minds is the fact that their behavior is intelligent and productive and
that we need to posit a mind—a system of mental representations and
processes—to explain the data of all the studies.
In light of the fact that mammals have minds in varying levels of
complexity, it is clear that many complex mental capacities exist
outside the human species. These capacities include complex social
awareness, self-awareness, rudimentary language, metaphorical
capacities, and the capacity to represent emotional significance.

Descriptive Criteria of Moral Agency
An important assumption that I make is that morality is
essentially a domain of significant things that matter. If this is
correct, then a moral agent is a being for whom things matter. In
other words, psychological capacities attune her to significance. One
capacity that is necessary for moral agency is therefore an
attunement to significance capacity—the capacity such that things
matter to the agent.5 In distinguishing a moral from a nonmoral
point of view, philosophers widely recognize an outlook that is
beyond self-interest to be crucially necessary. Another necessary
capacity is therefore the capacity to represent the welfare of others,
which arguably mostly consists in emotional states, such as
psychological distress; in other words, the agent must have capacity
for other-regarding higher-order intentionality.
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If morality involves care and concern for others, then
significance in others must motivate the agent’s action, and these two
capacities therefore suggest:
The descriptive constitutive criterion: The agent performs
an action and is motivated to perform it because she
believes its performance supports the significant interests
of others.6, 7
This criterion is constitutive, as opposed to evidential, and with
important qualifications, I offer it as a sufficient condition for being a
moral agent. The qualifications are that it implies other abilities that
are also necessary for moral agency. If an agent has the ability to
surmise a situation, to form an idea of an action, to form the belief
that performing it supports the significant interests of others, and to
perform the action, then the agent will have a cognitive ability to
reason and a behavioral ability to perform actions.
Any objection to the criterion will concern whether it states a
sufficient condition for moral agency or whether instances can be
confirmed empirically that satisfy it.
Although higher-order intentionality (like higher-order thought)
is not sufficient for moral agency, it is arguably sufficient for otherregard if it includes the capacity to represent the emotional states of
others. The attunement to significance capacity, other-regard, an
ability to reason, and a behavioral capacity to perform actions are
arguably the least necessary elements of moral agency.
An objection is that the descriptive constitutive criterion is
incapable of being confirmed. This objection is valid; the descriptive
constitutive criterion is difficult to confirm, since it requires knowing
about a motivationin the context of the agent’s belief that an action’s
performance supports the significant interests of others. To
overcome this difficulty, we must discard claims about the agent’s
motivation and belief and require that her action bring great costs to
herself. This emendation is imperfect, since bringing a cost to self is
not necessary for an action to be a moral action. Moreover, an
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action’s bringing costs to the agent and benefits to others is not
sufficient to make it a moral action, since she may be unaware of the
significance of what she is doing. Failure to rule out this possibility
makes for a serious weakness of virtually all alleged examples of
moral agency in animals.
An action that brings great costs to one and benefits to others is
only a “candidate” moral action, and it might suggest that the one
performing it is a moral agent. For assuranceof moral agency,
however, an action must satisfy a stricter criterion:
The descriptive evidential criterion: The agent performs
an action that promotes others’ significant interests and
brings great costs to herself, and we must confirm that she
is aware that she brings great costs to herself and
benefits to others.8,9
When her action satisfies the descriptive evidential criterion, we
know that she is aware that she brings great costs to herself and
benefits to others. When the agent is aware that her action brings
great costs to herself and benefits to others, we know that the reason
for benefiting others is more important to her than the reason she has
to avoid bringing the costs to herself. When the costs to self are
great, we know that bringing benefits to others—promoting others’
significant interests—matters greatly to her. We have very good
reason therefore to believe that she performed a moral action, and I
will call it a “moral act with assurance”.

Examples
Sperm whales: In October 1997 and 80 miles off the coast of
California, marine biologists documented instances of sperm whales
(Physeter macrocephalus) defending themselves from the attacks of
killer whales (Orcinus orca). In the first instance, nine sperm whales
defended themselves against thirty-five killer whales using a rosette
with heads in the center and tails defending the perimeter. The killer
whales attacked repeatedly for four hours, each attack spilling sperm
whale blood and body oil into the water. Every time they succeeded
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in pulling a sperm whale from the protective rosette, one or two
sperm whales left the rosette, joined the attacked sperm whale,
placed themselves between the sperm whale and the attacking killer
whales, and led the attacked sperm whale back into the rosette, even
though, this led instantly to the killer whales viciously attacking them
(p. 500). At least three and possibly all nine sperm whales received
fatal wounds.
Five days later, the marine biologists sighted two groups of five
sperm whales about a kilometer apart and a group of five killer
whales swimming toward one of the groups. When the killer whales
were about a kilometer from a sperm whale group, that sperm whale
group submerged for less than a minute and signaled to sperm
whales in surrounding waters using a distress call. Immediately, the
five sperm whales of the other group “started traveling rapidly
toward” them (p. 501). Additional sperm whales heard the distress
call, and the fifteen sperm whales that soon formed the group
appeared “vigilant with their heads raised from the water facing
different directions, and some of them were slapping the water with
their tails” (p. 501). The killer whales began attacking, causing severe
injuries. But, the researchers spotted additional groups of sperm
whales as far as seven kilometers away traveling rapidly to join the
group. When more sperm whales joined the group, they formed
different shapes: a “raft-like” shape when twenty in number, a
“spindle” shape when thirty in number, and when the sperm whale
group was fifty strong, the killer whales ceased attacks and shortly
thereafter were kilometers away (p. 502).
To confirm that an agent is aware of her action’s costs and
benefits, we may look to general considerations, such as the known
cognitive, emotional, and social intelligences of the species, along
with more specific considerations local to the setting of an action.
Both sperm whale behaviors—leaving the protective rosette and
joining the group under attack—are moral acts with assurance.
Sperm whales being a highly intelligent species of Cetacea with
exceptional echolocation and sensory acuity, researchers believe that
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sperm whales can discern predatory intent before killer whales attack
(Whitehead 2003). They can feel, see, and possibly smell themselves
bleeding and spilling body oil into the water. Given that they
continually echolocate to create three-dimensional images of their
environment, including the killer whales as well as their own lost
blood and body oil, and given that they had four hours to echolocate,
see, and passively listen while the killer whales attacked, there is no
basis for reasonable doubt that these sperm whales knew with
certainty that killer whales were attacking them.
An attack by killer whales is worse when a sperm whale is
outside the rosette than when she is inside its protection, and the
attacks are more frequent. The fact that the sperm whales formed the
rosette, sought its protection, and left it only when doing so helped
them to return a sperm whale back into its protection shows that they
know that being in the rosette is preferable and that leaving it will
likely cause killer whales to attack them severely. A sperm whale
therefore knows that an attack by killer whales is a significant cost.
Likewise, a sperm whale knows that by leading a sperm whale back
into the rosette, she benefits that sperm whale. In the first encounter,
by leaving the protective rosette, a sperm whale knowingly brings
great costs to herself and knowingly benefits another sperm whale.
Their actions therefore satisfy the requirement that they are aware
that their actions bring great costs to themselves and benefits to
others. Their actions therefore satisfy the descriptive evidential
criterion for moral agency. Conclusively, it is shown that sperm
whales are moral agents.
The second encounter further corroborates this conclusion, since
the behavior is similar at the group level and involves groups that are
between one and seven kilometers away joining the group that killer
whales are attacking. In humans, this would be like one group
choosing to join and assist another group that headhunters are
attacking with predatory intent when they could have easily fled. If a
human group acted in this manner, we would arguably not hesitate to
declare that it is a moral act with assurance.
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One might object that none of the actions shows moral agency
with assurance because natural (gene, kin, or group) selection may
explain the behavior of the sperm whales.
This is not an objection to my argument because my argument
concerns proximate causes—moral motivations. And the objection
concerns ultimate causes—the reasons behavior evolved. That
clarification shows that this objection based on ultimate causes does
not challenge my claim that sperm whales are motivated to promote
the significant interests of other sperm whales, since my claim
concerns proximate causes not ultimate causes.10
One may object that none of the actions shows moral agency
because, in each instance, the sperm whale performing the action
might be an immediate family member of the individual or
individuals that she benefits. Due to the extensive degree to which
one is emotionally invested in family, such an action is a selfinterested action, in which case, it is not a moral action.
Since sperm whale mothers birth a single calf every few years
(Whitehead 2003), in order for the fifty group members in the second
encounter to be immediate family, a mother would need to bear
young with a zero mortality rate for hundreds of years. Since a
female is fertile for a few decades, the fifty group members are not
immediate family, and the objection is rebutted. Moreover, “sperm
whale groups are not themselves particularly stable, often consisting
of two or more largely matrilineal units that swim together for
periods of days... [and] These social units may themselves split or
merge” (Rendell and Whitehead, 2001, p. 315). Therefore, although
in some cases, the sperm whale performing the action might be a
family member, it is not possible that this is always the case.
Moreover, if a family member or a friend might have performed some
of the moral acts with assurance, this is not the basis of an
insurmountable objection even against these, since it depends on the
disputable claim that filial bonds cannot be the source of moral
reasons. Robert Nozick (1981) and Christina Hoff Sommers (1986)
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argue compellingly that filial bonds can be the source of strong moral
reasons. Nevertheless, it is important to point out that the relative
cost of an action may outweigh considerations of filial bonds. An
action for a family member with a low cost to self will usually be a
weak example of moral agency, while an action with a high cost to self
may be a strong example. For instance, placing oneself between a
family member and an attacking predator or joining a group under
predatory attack is a strong example. Since the sperm whales’ actions
are the stronger type, sperm whales perform moral acts with
assurance and are therefore moral agents.
Rhesus monkeys: The experimenters tested rhesus monkeys in
pairs with one monkey as the operator and another monkey as the
stimulus animal. Two adjacent chambers are the operator’s box and
the stimulus animal’s box. The operator’s box contains two chains
that deliver food when pulled, one delivering a tiny amount (enough
that pulling the chain is, although worthwhile, not enough to reduce
their growing hunger), the other delivering a large amount. The
stimulus animal box’s floor is an electric grid that delivers high
frequency electroshocks through a monkey’s feet. A one-way visual
barrier divides the operator’s box from the stimulus animal box, and
it allows a monkey in the operator box to see inside the stimulus
animal box, but not vice versa.
After training, all the monkeys could work the apparatus well.
Researchers began the experiment 22 hours after withholding all
food. If the monkey in the operator box pulled the chain delivering a
tiny amount of food, she received it. If she pulled the chain delivering
the large amount of food, she received the food, and the monkey in
the stimulus animal box received a high frequency electroshock
through her feet.
When the other side of the box was vacant, all monkeys operated
the apparatus without hesitation. Once a monkey was in the stimulus
animal box, however, they were reluctant to pull the chains. Some
refrained entirely. This is an instance of moral agency in other
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species mitigating the suffering that results from unethical animal
experimentation.
I will refer to monkeys in the operator box as “naïve” if they had
never been shocked in the stimulus animal box, and “experienced” if
they had been shocked. The study found that naïve monkeys went
with tiny amounts of food for 1.2 days, on average, while experienced
monkeys went with tiny amounts of food for 7.6 days, on average, a
difference that is statistically significant (p<0.01). One experienced
monkey endured complete hunger for five days refraining from
pulling any chains. Another endured complete hunger for twelve
days (Masserman, 1964, p. 584). The studies clearly show several
things. A majority of rhesus monkeys (25 of 33) prefer to bring great
costs to themselves prolonging their extreme hunger—in order to
promote other monkeys’ significant interests by giving them a refuge
from further torture.11 In addition, experiencing a shock had a
significant effect.
Showing that the rhesus monkeys were aware of the costs to self
and benefits to others is straightforward. It is beyond dispute that
rhesus monkeys understand the relation of hunger to eating—one of
the most basic items of knowledge for a rhesus monkey. We can be
certain that they are aware of the costs to self, since they are fully
trained on the apparatus and were tested to ensure that they
understood the reward pairings of the chains to amounts of delivered
food. The fact that naïve monkeys had no food for 22 hours and
chose, nevertheless, to endure even greater hunger for more than
another day in order to avoid shocking the adjacent monkey shows
that even though they had not experienced shock, they were sensitive
to the behavior of the adjacent monkey, who would show
dramatically increased bodily activity, thrashing of limbs, frantic
jumping, and grimacing and vocalizations, all which occurs
immediately after pulling the chain for the large amount of food.
There is no reasonable basis for doubt therefore that when the
stimulus animal monkey is present, the operator is aware that pulling
the chain that administers a large amount of food results in two
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things—receiving a large amount of food and the adjacent monkey
receiving pain. The monkeys are aware, therefore, of the costs and
benefits.
Experienced monkeys know with certainty, of course, that the
consequence for the adjacent monkey is the pain and distress that
results from a shock. Naïve monkeys and especially experienced
monkeys are therefore aware of the costs to self and benefits to others
of the courses of action available to them, and their actions therefore
satisfy the descriptive evidential criterion. The rhesus monkeys
perform moral acts with assurance, and therefore, rhesus monkeys
are moral agents.
Monkeys were housed three to a cage for one year before the
experiment, and if a monkey in the operator box was the cagemate of
the monkey in the stimulus animal box, he was willing to suffer worse
hunger to avoid harming the monkey in the stimulus animal box with
whom he lived than to avoid harming a strange monkey. Although
this effect was not statistically significant (p = 0.07), it approached
statistical significance. These findings are consistent with a human
preference for persons with whom we share a filial bond, and
assuming that our having these slight preferences does not challenge
the foundation of moral agency in humans, then it also should not
challenge it in rhesus monkeys.
An objection is that the study does not rule out the possibility
that the monkeys were motivated out of a fear of retaliation, and if
they were so motivated, then their behavior is not moral. If fear of
retaliation were the motive, however, we would expect to see an
increase in behavioral indications of things associated with such fear,
such as dominance. Researchers showed with additional
experiments, however, that there was no effect of dominance on the
observed behaviors. Moreover, a stranger is equally or more likely to
retaliate. Being a former cagemate of the operator monkey, however,
protected a monkey some. Most importantly, being hungry for days
is a long time to be hungry, even for a human, and the urgency of the
present is strong during times of prolonged discomfort. It is simply
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implausible therefore that a monkey, or a human for that matter,
might be motivated so strongly by thoughts of future possible
scenarios while in the present grip of unrelenting discomfort.

General Objections
The two examples are proof that nonhuman mammals satisfy the
evidential criterion for moral agency, which I defend as being
sufficient for moral agency. I am likely to receive a certain type of
counterargument that defends the view that, regardless of the
examples of animal behavior, only humans are moral agents.
An objection is that the sperm whales and rhesus monkeys’
actions are, although compassionate, caring, and kind actions, not
motivated by a categorical imperative. The agent must assign herself
a categorical or unconditional imperative based on duty—what it is
right to do as determined by practical reason and apart from
inclination. For it to be moral agency, the action must be motivated
by a concern for the welfare of the other qua other—a source of
concern (or in terms of the present discussion, a “source of
significance”). There is not sufficient evidence that the sperm whales
or rhesus monkeys are motivated by anything beyond compassion,
care, and kindness.
In rebutting this sort of objection, it is first important to ask,
perhaps if only rhetorically, If the evidence I provided is not sufficient
to show that rhesus monkeys and sperm whales are motivated from
duty or something similar, then what sort of evidence would?
Although Kant’s moral theory defines duty, his theory is generally
understood to lack an account for how to confirm empirically when
actions are performed from duty. In other words, stated in terms
familiar to the present discussion, Kant’s theory is taken to provide
constitutive criteria of duty but no evidential criteria. Kant even
warns that it would be speculation to claim that an action was
actually motivated from duty because the mind and motives are never
fully knowable.
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Despite those considerations, Kant seems to provide evidential
criteria for performing a moral action. These center around his
notion of the imputation of an action, which is a vital notion in Kant’s
The Metaphysics of Morals,12 and Kant states that “Imputation
(imputatio) in the moral sense is the judgment by which someone is
regarded as the author... of an action” (p. 19). Kant explains that
“Subjectively, the degree to which an action can be imputed
(imputabilitas) has to be assessed by the magnitude of the obstacles
that had to be overcome” (ibid.). And, an example that Kant gives is
“The greater the natural obstacles (of sensibility) and the less the
moral obstacle (of duty), so much the more merit is to be accounted
for a good deed, as when, for example, at considerable self-sacrifice I
rescue a complete stranger from great distress” (ibid.). I suggest that
imputation is a descriptive evidential criterion of duty in the sense
that it concerns the actual conditions of attribution of moral worth to
an action. Furthermore, by a principle of parity, the moral acts with
assurance that the rhesus monkeys and sperm whales performed
satisfy Kant’s (descriptive evidential) criterion of imputabilitas. The
rhesus monkeys have a very great natural obstacle in hunger. In
addition, it would be very easy for them to pull the chain that delivers
a large amount of food. The sperm whales in both encounters have
great natural obstacles in the killer whales that are attacking them.
In addition, it would be very easy for them to remain in the protective
rosette in the first encounter and to flee the area in the second
encounter. Consequently, when “assessed by the magnitude of the
obstacles that had to be overcome,” the rhesus monkeys and sperm
whales may be regarded as the author of their good deeds. In a word,
their actions may be said to be motivated by duty or something like
duty.
One might object that the essence of morality resides in some
capacity that, for one, only humans have, and for another, that sperm
whales and rhesus monkeys do not exhibit. I will consider two
possible forms of this objection, one based on Peter Singer’s view and
another based on Christine Korsgaard’s view.
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One might object that the capacity to reason is advanced in
humans over that of other animals to such a degree that it affords
humans with capacities that all other animals lack and that such
capacities are the basis for moral agency. Therefore, humans and no
other animals are moral agents. Singer offers such an argument in
his response to primatologist Frans de Waal’s Tanner lectures.
Singer writes,
In The Expanding Circle, I suggested that it is our
developed capacity to reason that gives us the ability to
take the impartial perspective. As reasoning beings, we
can abstract from our own case and see that others,
outside our group have interests similar to our own. We
can also see that there is no impartial reason why their
interests should not count as much as the interests of
members of our own group, or indeed as much as our own
interests. Does this mean that the idea of impartial
morality is contrary to our evolved nature? Yes, if by “our
evolved nature” we mean the nature that we share with
the other social mammals from which we evolved. No
nonhuman animals, not even the other great apes, come
close to matching our capacity to reason. So if this
capacity to reason does lie behind the impartial element of
our morality, it is something new in evolutionary history
(p. 145).
And later Singer states that “[perhaps] we can reject [our initial]
emotional responses. . . only on the basis of other emotional
responses, but the process involves reason and abstraction, and may
lead us... to a morality that is more impartial than our evolutionary
history as social mammals would—in the absence of that reasoning
process—allow” (p. 150).
Developing Singer’s line of thought into a complete objection,
the idea is that an impartial morality depends on a humanlike
capacity to reason. Since other social mammals, such as rhesus
monkeys and sperm whales, have a much underdeveloped reasoning
capacity when compared to humans, members of such species are
incapable of abstracting from their own case and seeing that others
outside their group (or individual situation, presumably) have similar
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interests to their own. Rhesus monkeys and sperm whales therefore
cannot take an impartial perspective. Since according to Singer
(1993, p. 12) the impartial perspective is the mark of the moral, social
mammals such as rhesus monkeys or sperm whales are not moral
agents.
Such an objection may be rebutted. The objection’s first premise
is that no nonhuman animals come close to matching our capacity to
reason. Second, the capacity to reason lies behind the impartial
element of our morality. Third, the impartial perspective is necessary
to morality. From these claims, however, it would be a mistake to
infer that only humans have any impartial element of morality.
Singer’s “impartial perspective” is most plausible when understood as
a perspective that can have varying degrees of impartiality, since it
must be a psychological capacity that will vary in its development
between humans and within the same human over time. Sperm
whales and rhesus monkeys adopt perspectives that are somewhere
on a continuum of impartiality, so the question is whether the degree
to which they have it is enough for moral agency. I believe the
answer is “yes.” In the second encounter with killer whales, sperm
whales up to seven kilometers away swam to join the sperm whale
group being attacked. In the first encounter of sperm whales and
killer whales and in the rhesus monkey experiments, the moral
agents adopted a perspective that was sufficiently impartial with
regard to themselves in relation to one or more other animals such
that they acted on the other’s interests which they did despite their
having a pressing self-interest or need. They knowingly underwent
great hardship or costs to self in order to bring benefits, or avoid
bringing harms, to the other. If these are not instances of “seeing
that others outside [their] group have interests similar to [their]
own,” then neither Singer nor I must know what is. Even if we
assume that humans are unmatched in their reasoning abilities,
members of many species of mammal are, nevertheless, moral
agents.
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One might object that in order to perform a moral action, one
must be autonomous and freely choose to perform it; sperm whales
and rhesus monkeys might not be entirely free to choose to perform
any actions. Although animals, according to Kant, have sensation
and choice (1996, p. 192), they always choose one inclination over
other inclinations.13 Christine Korsgaard claims that “the capacity for
normative self-government [/autonomy] requires...a certain form of
self-consciousness: namely, consciousness of the grounds on which
you propose to act as grounds” (p. 113). A nonhuman is conscious of
the object that he fears or desires “as fearful or desirable, and so as
something to be avoided or sought” (p. 113). Korsgaard claims,
however, that “a rational animal is, in addition, conscious that she
fears or desires the object, and that she is inclined to act in a certain
way as a result” (p. 113). Her argument is that humans “do not
merely have intentions [but] assess and adopt them” (p. 113), and it is
that sort of capacity that morality is centered on and that only
humans have. Since “it is at this level that morality emerges” (p. 113)
and since “the capacity for normative self-government... is probably
unique to human beings...” (p. 116), it follows that humans and no
animals have morality.
The first and most obvious, and perhaps the strongest, basis for
rebutting Korsgaard’s objection is in the fact that the primary basis
for her distinction between animals and humans is higher-order
thought. One’s being “conscious that . . . [one has an emotional state
or ground for action]” is higher-order thought. While being aware
that it is always possible to build into a moral theory such complexity
or high-level thought that virtually no one would actually satisfy its
requirements, I point out that I have already suggested that higherorder thought is neither necessary nor sufficient for moral agency.
Korsgaard claims that “it is at this level [being conscious of the
ground of your beliefs] that morality emerges.” She does not provide
reason for believing, however, that morality emerges only at that
point, as opposed to just developing to a higher-level. For another,
although she prefaces her argument with claims to the contrary,14 her
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argument does suffer from the common error of pretending to
provide answers to open empirical questions. In addition to
suggesting that the empirical evidence shows that higher-order
thought, such as consciousness of the grounds of your beliefs, is
unnecessary and insufficient for moral agency, I suggest that these
capacities are psychological capacities had as a matter of degree, and
as has been shown, nonhuman mammals have them in varying
degrees.
Expecting a moral philosopher that is (confessedly)
unacquainted with the empirical literature on animal behavior to
decide whether any animals satisfy the criteria for moral agency is
like expecting an aeronautical engineer to determine whether any
animals are capable of flying a plane. The engineer may argue
compellingly that only humans could fly a plane, but these arguments
are beside the point if I produce animals that fly planes. Since I have
produced animals that perform moral acts with assurance, the
arguments of Kant, Singer, and Korsgaard that animals do not are
beside the point. Regardless of the merits of their arguments in their
own right, they are ineffective. I conclude that, despite their
arguments to the contrary, moral agency exists in other species such
as rhesus monkeys and sperm whales.

Concluding Remarks
The founder of cognitive ethology Donald Griffin points out that
the touchstone of credibility for animal behavioral evidence is
unprecedentedly unfair. In other areas of science, data are weighed
and assessed reasonably. In animal behavioral studies, unusually
strict criteria must be satisfied in order for the data to count as real
evidence.
It is for this reason that I have argued the way I have, and I have
succeeded in showing that members of both aquatic and land species
of mammals satisfy the descriptive evidential criterion. Since the
descriptive evidential criterion is stricter than the descriptive
constitutive criterion, while the descriptive constitutive criterion is
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the more accurate criterion, it is likely that members of many species
of mammals are moral agents, at least according to the framework I
provided for moral agency. Moreover, the proofs and arguments that
I have given of moral agency in nonhuman mammals casts a new look
on how to interpret compelling examples of what are “candidate”
actions according to my criteria. For instance, elephant researchers
document numerous instances of elephants assisting injured or
disabled elephants and rhinoceroses (Hart et al., 2008, p. 91).
Though the costs to self may be small costs to self are not necessary
for the constitutive criterion (they are only necessary evidentially),
and it is highly likely that elephants would do these things even if the
costs to self were greater. Finally, the same applies to hundreds of
other instances of behavior in many other species of mammals. In
conclusion, social mammals such as rhesus monkeys and sperm
whales, and likely including the members of many other species, are
moral agents.

Notes
1. Throughout his decades of psychiatric practice evaluating and
treating ‘many hundred psychopaths’ (p. 188), Cleckley reports that
he was never able to uncover “a sense of guilt or remorse (conscious
or unconscious) in any of the psychopaths” that he studied (p. 131).
2. See Hare (2006) and Blair (1995) for review. Shaun Nichols (2002)
reviews evidence to show that the capacity to make the
moral/conventional distinction “indicates a basic capacity for moral
judgment” (p. 222).
3. See Delfour and Marten (2001) for killer whale stage 4 mirror selfrecognition, see Hart et al. (2008) for review of elephants, dolphins,
and primates.
4. Hauser and his colleagues dyed the hair on top of their head, which
is a highly salient feature of their appearance. This produced selfdirected mirror behavior in them: “Only individuals with dyed hair
and prior mirror exposure touched their head while looking in the
mirror” (Hauser et al., 1995, p. 10811).
5. An animal may achieve a strong sense of psychological significance
without any added complexity of thought. Positing an attunement to
significance capacity in moral agents may, inversely, help to explain
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the existence of the psychopath since he lacks significance in himself
(see Cleckley, 1976). Cleckley describes the psychopath’s central
deficit as an inability to experience life with the meaning and
importance that define life for others (p. 371), which is similar to
lacking an attunement to significance capacity.
6. In addition to including the condition “performs an action,” this
criterion also implicitly includes the condition of refraining from
performing an action.
7. Since, as Cleckley explains, the pure psychopath’s lack of personal
significance prevents the psychopath from being able to acknowledge
that others have significant interests, the psychopath cannot be
motivated to act to support the significant interests of others, and
thus fails the descriptive constitutive condition. Given the severe
impairments that psychopaths show when it comes to what we deem
moral behavior and moral attitudes, the psychopath’s failure to
satisfy this criterion is evidence that the descriptive constitutive
criterion describes something that is possibly developmentally
necessary for moral agency.
8. As with the previous criterion, this criterion also implicitly includes
the condition of refraining from performing an action. The transition
from the constitutive to the evidential criterion is a loss of precision
because an agent is a moral agent by virtue of the nature and content
of the agent’s motives and beliefs (it is not necessary that an action
bring a cost to self for it to be a moral action). Some opportunity cost
to self may be implied in any action that supports others, since
performing an action that supports others may prevent performing
other actions that support oneself.
9. Satisfying it is possible without higher-order thought, as an agent
may estimate costs to self and benefits to others with basic reasoning
abilities and find significant interests in others with only higher-order
intentionality. The more significant the costs to self, the better is the
evidence of moral agency.
10. In any case, the objection to moral agency on the grounds of
evolutionary pressure fares poorly in this case with sperm whales.
The behavior of the sperm whales resulted in an exponentially greater
number of casualties than would self-interested behavior. Thirty-five
killer whales cannot consume more flesh in one feeding than that
which is contained in one sperm whale. Were the sperm whales to
behave according to a ‘cold shoulder’ policy, collectively seeking
refuge in the rosette even when a fellow sperm whale was forced out
by predators, then only a single sperm whale would have perished. In
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short, helping members who are pulled out of the rosette is not
adaptive for the self or the species.
11. At least, rhesus monkeys as experimental subjects since some
might have participated in more than one study
12. Although The Metaphysics of Morals is less popular, Kant wrote
it later in his life and over a much longer time.
13. Kant was mistaken to make such claims about what are open
empirical questions.
14. Christine Korsgaard writes, “although I believe the capacity for
autonomy is characteristic of human beings and unique to human
beings, the question how far in the animal kingdom that capacity
extends is certainly an empirical one” (p. 112-113).
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